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Abstract 
‘Leading candidates’ competed for the European Commission Presidency in the campaign 
for the European elections in May 2014. This element of political contestation poses a 
challenge to the Union’s institutional design. This article investigates to what extent 
competing ‘leading candidates’ enhances the process of deliberation and party contestation 
and thus strengthen the role of European Parliament (EP) party groups. In light of the 
example of the ‘Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats’ and its ‘leading 
candidate’, Martin Schulz, it is shown that the election campaign did strive to be EU-wide. 
However, Schulz’s influence on internal party cohesion and coalition formation remained 
limited. Therefore the influence of an elected ‘leading candidate’ is regarded as a symbolic 
act, which could deepen the relationship between the EP and the Commission as well as 
strengthen the democratic and political standing of both institutions vis-à-vis the European 
Council. 
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In light of the slogan ‘This time it is different’,1 so-called ‘leading candidates’2 for the 
Presidency of the European Commission were nominated and elected to represent their 
respective European Parliament (EP) party group in the European elections in May 2014. By 
presenting their visions for the European Union (EU), a parliamentary electoral campaign 
took place “in which political parties and their candidates compete[d] on the basis of 
alternative programmes which address the European dimension”. 3  This competition 
introduced a new element of political contestation at the European level, which could pose a 
challenge to the Union’s institutional design characterised by consensus-oriented decision-
making. Despite this incompatibility, the EP party groups nominated and elected their 
‘leading candidates’. In the attempt to politicise the European elections and to better identify 
the profile of the different EP party groups, the parliamentarians follow the spirit of Art. 17.7 
of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and its Declaration No. 
11: 
“Taking into account the elections to the EP and after having held the appropriate 
consultations, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall propose to 
the EP a candidate for the President of the Commission. This candidate shall be 
elected by the EP by a majority of its component members [...].”4  
 
Even though the idea of competing ‘leading candidates’ was put into practice, there 
were many politicians who expressed their concern, including President of the European 
Council Herman Van Rompuy
5
 and German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
6
 However, 
advocates of this idea such as European University Institute Joseph H. H. Weiler, interpreted 
the elections of and competition among leading candidates as an attempt to bring a necessary 
                                                 
1
 ‘ This time it is different’ is the official slogan of the EP elections campaign in 2014. 
2
  In European media the German term ‘Spitzenkandidat’ is widely known. However, the author uses the 
English translation ‘leading candidate’ in this work.   
3
  European Parliament, European Parliament resolution of 4 july 2013 on improving the practical 
arrangements for the holding of the European elections in 2014, 2013/2102(INI), 4 July 2013.   
4
  N. Foster, EU Treaties & Legislation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 21
st
 edition, p. 8. 
5
   L. Cerulus, ‘Van Rompuy scorns direct election of Commission President’, EurActiv, 14 October 2013, p. 
1.   
6
  L. Cerulus, ‘German coalition talks cast long shadow over EU elections’, EurActiv, 29 October 2013, p. 1.   
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change to the EU without revising its treaties and legislation.
7
 Taking this argument into 
closer consideration, there is in particular one question which needs to be highlighted: does 
the idea of ‘leading candidates’ - as stated in a communication from the Commission to the 
EP as well as to other institutional entities –  
“make concrete and visible the link between the individual vote of the EU citizens for 
a candidate for membership of the EP and the candidate for President of the 
Commission supported by the party of the candidate MEP”?8 
 
This article investigates to what extent competing ‘leading candidates’ enhances the 
process of deliberation and party contestation and thus strengthens the role of EP party 
groups. The analysis is framed in view of the debate on the democratic deficit as well as the 
Union’s institutional framework by using the example of the Progressive Alliance of 
Socialists and Democrats (S&D)’s ‘leading candidate’ Martin Schulz. Even though in the 
May 2014 European elections the European People’s Party (EPP) became the strongest party 
in the EP and ‘leading candidate’ Jean-Claude Junker was nominated as President of the 
Commission by the European Council, the analysis still holds in terms of the effect that it 
had on party cohesion, coalition formation and inter-institutional relations.   
The article begins by presenting the theoretical framework. Firstly, insights into 
concepts of democracy and democratic deficit are provided to explain the necessity of 
political contestation at the European level. Secondly, the reader is acquainted with the 
institutional design of the EU to underline the challenges linked with the implementation of 
Art. 17.7 TEU and its Declaration No. 11. Thirdly, three criteria are established according to 
which the influence of political forces can be analysed. Finally, the hypotheses are 
introduced. In the second part, the focus shifts to an analysis of the influence of ‘leading 
candidates’ with regard to their role in creating an EU-wide campaign, in strengthening the 
                                                 
7
  Prof. J. H. H. Weiler, ‘Euro-Elections 2014: The Quiet Revolution’, Brugge, College of Europe, 2 
October 2013.   
8
  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2013)126 final, 
12 March 2013.   
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profile of EP party groups as well as in shaping the inter-institutional relations. In the third 
part, the findings are evaluated and subsequently related to the initial research question. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn. 
 
1. A Theoretical Framework to Explain the Influence of Political Forces 
Christopher J. Lord suggests reducing democracy to two core attributes:  
“The first is that the public must be able to control those who make decisions on its 
behalf [...]; and, second, citizens should exercise such control as equals [...].”9 
Even though there are different forms of democracy, certain elements are common in all 
democratic societies.
10
 For instance, according to Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, the 
main features of democracy are:  
“institutionally established procedures that regulate competition for control over 
political authority, on the basis of deliberation, where nearly all adult citizens are 
permitted to participate in an electoral mechanism where their expressed preferences 
over alternative candidates determine the outcome, in such ways that the government 
is responsive to the majority or to as many as possible.”11  
 
1.1. ‘Leading Candidates’: An Attempt for Greater Political Contestation 
The EU institutions are often criticised for being deficient with regard to its 
democratic nature. In view of this criticism, the focus now shifts to the notion of a 
‘democratic deficit’ at the European level. Even though there is no clear definition of this 
notion, certain features can be raised:  
“the unelected character of the Commission, the alleged weakness of the EP, the 
withdrawal of powers from national parliaments, lack of European political identity 
or ‘demos’, low voter participation in European elections, the absence of strong 
                                                 
9
  C. J. Lord, ‘Democracy and Democratization in the European Union’, in S. Bromley (ed.), Governing the 
European Union, London, Sage, 2001, pp. 166-167.  
10
  A. H. Birch, The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy, London/New York, Routledge, 2001, pp. 
72-73. 
11
  A. Follesdal and S. Hix, ‘Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and 
Moravcsik’, European Governance Papers, no. C-05-02, 2005, pp. 14-15. 
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democratic intermediaries such as political parties, the remoteness and obscurity of 
the Union’s decision making procedures, and doubtless much else besides [...]”.12  
Despite the ‘classical appearance’ of the academic debate on the democratic deficit, an 
“increasing number of academics [argue] that the democratic deficit has been overstated and, 
indeed, that it may not actually exist”.13 According to Andrew Moravcsik, the transfer of 
certain political competences to non-majoritarian entities is justified as (1) elected Member 
State governments act as control mechanisms; (2) the constitutional settlement imposes 
constraints on EU policy and thus prevents the Union against arbitrariness and 
unaccountable technocracy; and (3) finally,  
“constitutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control via national 
governments and the increasing powers of the EP are sufficient to assure that the EU 
policy-making is [...] politically responsive to the demands of European citizens”.14   
However, Follesdal and Hix question Moravcsik’s argument. They stress the fact that  
“voters’ preferences are not fixed or purely exogenously determined [...] [meaning 
that] citizens form their views about which policy options they prefer through the 
process of deliberation and party contestation that are essential elements of all 
democracies”.15  
Demands for greater political contestation have often been expressed, but this raises 
the question why political contestation is desirable at the European level. According to Hix, 
greater political competition is desirable for four reasons. Firstly, ordinary European citizens 
are able to choose between competing political leaders with rival agendas. Secondly, 
political competition enables citizens to form preferences and thus to identify themselves 
with a certain political leader at the European level. Thirdly, competition provides the 
winner with a political mandate which might be accepted by the electorate as a result of a 
                                                 
12
  C. J. Lord, Democracy in the European Union, Sheffield, Sheffield Academic Press/University 
Association for Contemporary European Studies, 1998, p. 11.  
13
  I. Bache, S. George and S. Bulmer, Politics in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2011, 3rd edition, p. 67. 
14
  A. Moravscik, ‘In Defence of the Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 4, 2002, p. 605. 
15
  Follesdal and Hix, op. cit., p. 13. 
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fair contest. Finally, greater political competition might lead to the formation of a European 
demos in the future.
16
   
The Treaty of Lisbon has introduced a more open political battle with regard to the 
appointment process of the Commission Presidency. Bearing in mind that the institutional 
setting at the European level is oriented towards finding a consensus, the following question 
needs to be highlighted: is the EU institutional system designed for ‘constrained politics’? 
To answer this question, the following section focuses on the nature of the Union’s 
institutional design. 
1.2. The Institutional Design of the EU and Art. 17.7 TEU: A Question of 
Incompatibility? 
The institutional design of the EU is based on the concept of ‘institutional balance’, 
which refers to the rule that “[EU] institutions have to act within the limits of their 
competences” as defined by the treaties.17 Since the beginning of the European integration 
process, several treaty revisions have extended the Union’s competences and policies in 
various fields. In view of the extension of these powers, an institutional balance is 
considered necessary to guarantee the representation of different interests at the European 
level.
18
  
The legal principle of ‘institutional balance’ and the need to form intra- und inter 
institutional coalitions to secure policy changes underline the consensus-oriented design of 
the EU.
19
 This is in particular reflected in the Community Method. Within the scope of this 
work, the ordinary legislative procedure is of special interest as the role of the EP has been 
                                                 
16
  S. Hix, ‘Why the EU needs (Left-Right) Politics? Policy Reform and Accountability are Impossible 
without it’ in S. Bartolini and S. Hix, ‘Politics: The Right or the Wrong Sort of Medicine for the EU?’, 
Notre Europe Policy Paper no. 19, 2006, pp. 7-11. 
17
  J.-P. Jacqué, ‘The Principle of Institutional Balance’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 41, 2004, p. 383. 
18
  J. Monar, ‘The European Union’s Institutional Balance of Power After the Lisbon Treaty’, 2012, online 
paper, p. 1, retrieved 14 October 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/education/jean-monnet/doc/ecsa10/ 
monarb_en.pdf. 
19
  A. Lijphart, Pattern of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999; G. Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2002. 
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strengthened with every treaty revision. Strengthening the only directly elected European 
institution has been regarded as an appropriate mean to address the democratic deficit. 
Therefore, the focus now shifts to the role and importance of this institution.
20
  
The Nature of the Party System in the European Parliament 
Since its establishment in 1952, the EP has moved “from being a ‘minimal 
legislature’ with hardly any influence on the policy output to a ‘reactive legislature’ with 
policy influencing power”.21 This institution has increased its power in two traditional fields 
of parliamentary authority, namely legislative power and executive appointment. The lack of 
competition among the party groups in the EP and the resulting difficulty for European 
citizens to identify with a certain group and its political approach is often criticised. 
However, bearing the Union’s consensus-oriented design in mind, the following question 
needs to be highlighted: is the idea of competing ‘leading candidates’ for the Commission 
Presidency compatible with the nature of the EP party system?  
Political parties appear in three different forms within the EU system: (1) as national 
political parties, (2) as party groups in the EP and (3) as parties at the European level or - as 
they are also known - as EU-wide party federations.
22
The party system in the EP 
distinguishes itself from party systems at the national level with regard to the fact that there 
is no executive actor at the European level. The only directly elected institution strives to 
demonstrate unity against the Commission and the Council of Ministers, which reflects its 
consolidated nature.
23
 The following three criteria underline the special character of the party 
system in the EP: first, the members of the EP (MEP) are aligned in seven political parties 
                                                 
20
  L. Buonanno and N. Nugent, ‘The Principle Policy Institutions’, in L. Buonanno and N. Nugent (eds.), 
Policies and Policy Processes of the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrace Macmillian, 2013, pp. 40-
57; A. Kreppel, ‘Rules, Ideology and Coalition Formation in the European Parliament: Past, Present and 
Future’, European Union Politics, vol. 1, no. 3, 2000, p. 358. 
21
  T. Faas, ‘To defect or not to defect? National, institutional and party group pressures on MEPs and their 
consequences for party group cohesion in the European Parliament’, European Journal of Political 
Research, vol. 42, 2003, p. 842. 
22
  A. Rasmussen, ‘Party soldiers in a non-partisan community? Party linkage in the European Parliament’, 
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 15, no. 8, 2008, pp. 1164-1165. 
23
  Further explanations are given at page 23 and 24.  
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according to the traditional left/right dimension.
24
 Second, the party system is characterised 
by growing fragmentation. Finally, despite or rather due to its fragmented nature, the two 
main political groups (the EPP and the S&D) often collude to secure the institution’s unity.25 
In addition, it is important to underline that MEPs face a dilemma in the party system 
in the EP due to the multi-level nature of the EU: on the one hand, they have to defend 
national party interests. On the other hand, they have to support the interests of EP 
committees and their political group leaderships. As a consequence, MEPs are seen as agents 
of two potential principals.
26
  
Nonetheless, “a party system has two essential elements: (1) organization [...]; and 
(2) competition [...]”.27 If one of these elements is underdeveloped, voters’ choices are not 
effectively reflected in final policy outcomes. The party system in the EP has internally 
hierarchical party organizations. Nonetheless, it does not follow a competitive-based 
approach. Thus, many scholars of the ‘democratic deficit’ demand a competitive party 
system in the EP. The Treaty of Lisbon has introduced such a competitive element with the 
possibility of rival ‘leading candidates’ for the Commission Presidency. Whereas some 
assume that the competition of ‘leading candidates’ for the Commission Presidency impairs 
the consensual nature of EU decision-making, others argue that this might even lead to a 
politicisation of the EU.
28
  
In view of the contradicting assumptions, the following questions need to be 
highlighted:  
- To what extent are ‘leading candidates’ able to contribute to EU-wide campaign 
which raises public awareness and interest in European elections?  
                                                 
24
  S. Hix, ‘Legislative Behaviour and Party Competition in the European Parliament: An Application of 
Nominate to the EU’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 39, no. 4, 2001, p. 665. 
25
  S. Hix, A. Kreppel and A. Noury, ‘The Party System in the European Parliament: Collusive or 
Competitive?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 41, no. 2, 2003, pp. 315-318. 
26
  S. Hix and B. Hoyland, The Political System of the European Union, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011, p. 55; Rasmussen, op. cit., p. 166. 
27
  Hix, Kreppel and Noury, op. cit., p. 309. 
28
  R. Ladrech, ‘National Political Parties and European Governance: The Consequences of ‘Missing in 
Action’’, West European Politics, vol. 30, no. 5, 2007, p. 955.   
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- To what extent can ‘leading candidates’ strengthen the party groups in the EP that 
might - as a far-reaching effect - even shape the political standing of the only 
directly elected European institution?  
To answer these questions the following section provides an analytical framework on the 
influence of political forces.  
1.3.  The Influence of Political Forces 
According to Bertoncini, the influence of a political force can be measured in view of 
the following three criteria: the number of seats won as a result of the party’s ability to 
convince citizens of its political approach during the European election campaign; the 
internal cohesion of the party group and its ability to form majority coalitions with other 
parties; and the inter-institutional context.
29
  
In light of these criteria, the following three hypotheses are tested to investigate to 
what extent competing ‘leading candidates’ enhances the process of deliberation and party 
contestation and thus strengthen the role of party groups in the EP: 
(1) The competition among ‘leading candidates’ leads to EU-wide campaigns, which 
raise public awareness and interest in the elections. 
(2) The competition among ‘leading candidates’ strengthens the profile of EP party 
groups as: 
a. the ‘leading candidate’ contributes to improve the  interaction within the EP 
party group, which strengthen its public perception and thus enhance the 
chances for his fellow party members to be ‘(re-) elected’; 
b. the ‘leading candidate’ contributes to an increase in internal party cohesion 
due to his influence on ‘office seeking’, i.e. the distribution of portfolios 
within the EP party group; 
                                                 
29
  Y. Bertonicini, ‘European Elections: Less Abstention, More “Populism”?’, Notre Europe Tribune, 
November 2013, p. 5.  
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c. the ‘leading candidate’ convinces his fellow EP party group members to 
engage in alliances with other parties based on ‘European ideologies’, i.e. 
left/right coalition formation, which shapes the party group’s ‘policy 
seeking’. 
(3) The election of a ‘leading candidate’ improves the accountability of the Commission 
vis-à-vis the EP and thus the electorate, as well as strengthens the democratic and 
political standing of both institutions vis-à-vis the European Council.  
 
The following section tests these three hypotheses. The timeframe is limited to the 
nomination of the ‘leading candidate’ of the S&D in November 2013 to the beginning of 
May 2014. Firstly, the analysis focuses on the influence of the ‘leading candidate’ on 
advertising an EU-wide campaign in view of his nomination and election process and the 
election campaign as such. Secondly, the influence of the ‘leading candidate’ on 
strengthening the profile of his EP party group is analysed with regard to the chances for his 
fellow party members to be (re-) elected as well as in view of ‘office’ and ‘policy’ seeking 
within the S&D. Thirdly, the influence of the ‘leading candidate’ on the inter-institutional 
relations between the EP and the Commission as well as society’s expectations towards the 
European Council in view of Art. 17.7 TEU are considered.  
The exact influence of a political force in view of the number of seats won can only 
be measured by the final election result. However, it is possible to measure an EP party 
group’s possible influence with regard to the predicted number of seats it might win. To 
analyse the internal cohesion of a party group, it is important to measure the ideological 
proximity as well as the effectiveness of a party group organization. A political group’s 
ability to form majority coalitions within the EP is firstly analysed with regard to the interest 
of the institution to be on the winning side and secondly in terms of policy preferences, 
which need to be analysed in the overall intra- and inter-institutional context. These two 
13 
 
criteria must be considered in the framework of two types of institutions, namely the internal 
and the external side in the overall scope of the separated-powers system at the European 
level. In this context, the internal side refers to the structure of incentives inside the 
legislature, whereas the external side rather focuses on the structure of relations between on 
the one hand the EP and on the other hand the executive. With regard to the specific nature 
of the EU system, the structural framework inside the legislature can serve as an incentive to 
powerful legislative party organization, while legislative parties are less cohesive in their 
relationship to other institutions.
30
  
The structure of incentives inside the legislative is evaluated with regard to three 
main objectives legislators pursue on both sides of the left/right dimension: (re-)election, 
office seeking and policy seeking. The structure of relations between the EP and the 
executive is studied in view of the EP’s interest to be perceived as a united actor in the EU 
system.
31
 Furthermore, the relationship with other institutions is investigated with regard to a 
possible politicisation of the EU. 
 
2.  Case Study: Martin Schulz as the ‘Leading Candidate’ 
This section tests the three hypotheses by applying the theoretical framework described 
above on the impact of Martin Schulz’s ‘leading candidate’ campaign on the party group.  
2.1.  The Role of the ‘Leading Candidate’ in an EU-Wide Election Campaign 
The first hypothesis tested is that the competition among ‘leading candidates’ leads to 
EU-wide campaigns, which raises public awareness and interest in the elections. The 
analytical approach is divided into the following three steps: firstly, the position of the 
‘leading candidate’ as a credible alternative to other pro-European candidates is analysed. 
Secondly, the position of the respective EP party group as a credible alternative to other 
                                                 
30
  S. Hix, A. Noury and G. Roland, ‘Power to the Parties: Cohesion and Competition in the European 
Parliament, 1979-2001’, British Journal of Political Science, vol. 35, no. 2, 2005, pp. 211-215. 
31
  A. Noury and G. Roland, ‘European Parliament – Should it have more power?’, Economic Policy, 2002,    
pp. 305, 311.    
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parties is assessed by focussing in particular on the election campaign of the Party of 
European Socialists (PES), which shapes the perception of the S&D party group. Finally, the 
decrease/increase of public awareness and interest in the elections and in particular the 
support for the S&D party is examined.  
Personalizing European Politics: The Nomination and Election Process 
Machmer, spokesperson to the President of the EP, stated in an interview on 26 
March 2014 in Brussels, 
“we have witnessed a new phenomenon over the last few years, not least due to the 
economic crisis. A real European public sphere (Öffentlichkeit) is developing [...]. 
Having internationally competing leading candidates is a natural succession in that 
development [...].”32 
The vision of the PES is reflected in the nomination and election process of the ‘leading 
candidate’ as well as in the election campaign. On 1 March 2014, the PES Election Congress 
in Rome ratified the votes on the ‘leading candidate’ and adopted the Party Manifesto. 
Schulz was elected as the ‘leading candidate’ with 91.1% by the PES Member Parties.33 The 
PES Manifesto underlines the party’s desired move ‘Towards a New Europe’, which is 
reflected in:  
- ‘A Union that progresses’ in view of (1) the creation of jobs, (2) the re-launch of 
the economy and (3) the regulation of the financial sector in line with the services of 
the citizens and the real economy as well as (4) the creation of a sense of community 
and respect for European citizens;   
- ‘A Union that protects’ (5) equality and women’s rights as well as (6) the Union’s 
diversity and (7) guarantees a safe and healthy life for all its citizens; 
                                                 
32
  Interview with A. Machmer, spokesperson to the President of the European Parliament, Brussels, 26 
March 2014.    
33
  H. Knaup, ‘Krönungsmesse für den Buchhändler aus Würselen’, Spiegel Online, 1 March 2014, retrieved 
2 March 2014, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/europawahl-martin-schulz-wird-spitzenkandidat-der-
sozialdemokraten-a-956426.html.  
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- ‘A Union that performs’ (8) more democracy and participation, (9) protects the 
planet from an ecological perspective and (10) promotes its influence beyond its 
borders.
34
  
 
These ten ambitious goals were taken up by the elected ‘leading candidate’ in his speech at 
the PES Congress in Rome, which underlines the mutual support and the common challenge 
of the PES and its ‘leading candidate’.35  
The launch of the PES European Candidate for the EP elections in 2014 was paved at 
the PES Congress in Prague in 2009. The PES Congress unanimously decided to pursue a 
common strategy and to implement a Party Manifesto, which would be embodied by a 
‘leading candidate’ running for the Commission Presidency. In the following year, the PES 
decided at the Warsaw Council that a PES candidate would be designated as the winner of a 
democratic and transparent process.
36
 The required rules, the procedure and the timeframe 
were adopted at the Brussels Council in 2011.
37
 At the Brussels Congress the PES officially 
amended its statutes to have a ‘leading candidate’ who is democratically elected.38 This 
amendment paved the way for the open process to accept nominations. During the official 
nomination period Schulz was nominated by the German Social Democrat Party (SPD) and 
supported by 21 PES Member parties. Following this support he was nominated as 
                                                 
34
 Party of European Socialists, PES Manifesto – Towards a New Europe, Rome, 1 March 2014, retrieved 7 
March 2014, http://www.martin-schulz.eu/en/assets/media/download/pes_manifesto_towards_a_new_ 
europe.pdf. 
35
  M. Schulz, ‘Speech at the Rome Congress of the Party of European Socialists’, 1 March 2014, p. 10, 
retrieved 7 March 2014, http://www.spd.de/linkableblob/116518/data/20140301_schulz_rede_pes_ 
rom.pdf. 
36
  Party of European Socialists, A democratic and transparent process for designating the PES candidate for 
the European Commission Presidency – Resolution adopted by the PES Council in Warsaw on 2 
December 2010, Warsaw, 2/3 December 2010, retrieved 13 April 2014, http://www.pes.eu/sites/ 
www.pes.org/files/adopted_pes_council_resolution_2_en.pdf.  
37
  Party of European Socialists, PES Resolution – Selecting our common candidate in 2014, Brussels, 24 
November 2011, retrieved 12 April 2014, http://www.pes.eu/sites/www.pes.org/files/adopted_ 
resolution___selecting_our_common_candidate_in_2014___en.pdf.    
38
  The exact wording of Chapter 5, Article 24.1 is: “The Election Congress shall select the PES common 
Candidate to the European Commission Presidency, through an open, transparent and democratic 
competitive process [and shall] adopt the PES Manifesto for the European elections.”; Party of European 
Socialists, PES Statutes adopted by the 9
th
 PES Congress, Brussels, 28/29 September 2012, retrieved 12 
April 2014, http://www.pes.eu/sites/www.pes.org/files/pes_statutes_2012_en.pdf.    
16 
 
‘candidate designate’ in November 2013 and finally elected as ‘leading candidate’ at the 
PES Election Congress in Rome in March 2014.
 
The Party Manifesto and the common 
‘leading candidate’, who embodies the political vision of the PES and personifies the S&D 
party group, are necessary conditions to lead an EU-wide campaign. Nonetheless, it is 
necessary to analyse the election campaign, as only its approach and to a certain extent its 
success can prove its EU-wide character. Therefore, the focus shifts in the next section to the 
election campaign and its specific characteristics.  
An EU-Wide Election Campaign: Bridging National Borders 
According to Sir Julien Priestley, former Secretary-General of the EP and the 
campaign manager for Schulz, the election campaign comprises traditional and modern 
elements, i.e. the ‘leading candidate’ does EU-wide visits and participates in public 
campaign events, which are then shared on his social media platforms to reach the greatest 
possible audience beyond national and linguistic borders.
39
 During the official election 
campaign, Schulz visited most EU Member States, during which he either launched the 
campaign or contributed to an event. The events always promoted the ‘leading candidate’ as 
well as the respective politician running for office as an MEP. In addition, the campaign was 
announced, followed and evaluated on social media, in particular on the Facebook and 
Twitter profiles of the ‘leading candidate’. These profiles accompanied the PES campaign 
‘Knock the vote’, in which  
“PES activists and volunteers directly talk to millions of European voters in their 
countries and on their door steps about their future [...] to win an election from the 
grassroots up”.40  
In view of the analysis of the nomination and election process of Schulz as the 
‘leading candidate’ for the PES as well as the common election campaign, it can be 
                                                 
39
  Sir Julien Priestley, ‘The 2014 EP elections – really different this time? Roundtable with Mr. Jo Leinen 
and Sir Julien Priestly’, Brugge, College of Europe, 17 March 2014.   
40
  Party of European Socialists, ‘PES: Knock the vote’, published on 11 March 2014, retrieved 18 April 
2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0CrwVinFMEg.   
17 
 
concluded that the competition of ‘leading candidates’ led to an EU-wide campaign. 
According to Görgen, journalist and department head of ‘Trimediale Nachrichten bei SWR’ 
in Germany, a ‘leading candidate’ should strive for the creation of a pan-European public 
sphere as “people are interested in a politician they believe they can trust. If the politician 
succeeds in setting out his vision, much would be won from a political perspective.”41        
 To find out to what extent the competition among ‘leading candidates’ and the EU-
wide campaign of the PES raise public awareness and interest in the election campaign, the 
focus shifts in the next section to the increase in the followers of the ‘leading candidate’ on 
Social Media as well as opinion polls provided by PollWatch 2014.   
The Measurement of Public Interest: A Possible Increase? 
The role of Social Media is important in the election campaign and might reflect to a 
certain extent the voters’ support. Since his nomination as ‘candidate designate’ in 
November 2013, Schulz succeeded in gaining supporters on his Facebook and Twitter 
profiles. In line with the increase in followers on social media, it was plausible to assume 
that there was an increase in public awareness and interest in the PES election campaign. 
Nonetheless, it needs to be stressed that Schulz converted his social media accounts for use 
in the election campaign. For example, on his Facebook profile he did not inform his fans 
about his ‘impartial’ work as President of the EP but as ‘leading candidate’. In addition, he 
turned his Twitter account from ‘President of the European Parliament’ into ‘I am the 
@PES_PSE candidate for President of the @EU_Commission in #EP2014’ in March 2014.42 
As a logical consequence, Schulz’ web campaign was in particular followed by citizens who 
were interested in his political work as President of the EP. However, this interest was not 
automatically linked with support for his election campaign.  
                                                 
41
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 In contrast to social media, opinion polls made more reliable predictions with regard 
to the (expected) seats won in the EP. According to these predictions, the S&D was ahead 
the EPP after the PES Election Congress in Rome in March 2014. However, as indicated in 
the following Table, the S&D lost its lead and was expected to have 5 seats less than the EPP 
shortly before the election.   
 
Table 1 Expected Seat Allocation 
Date EPP S&D 
   
05.03.2014 202 209 
01.04.2014 212 212 
16.04.2014 222 209 
25.04.2014 217 208 
30.04.2014 213 208 
Data retrieved from  K. Cunningham and S. Hix, ‘Who will win the EP elections?’, VoteWatch. Accessed on 2 
May 2014, http://www.electio2014.eu/pollsandscenarios/pollsblog 
 
Following these predictions it could not be concluded that the election campaign of the PES 
raised public awareness and interest in the political vision set out by this political camp. 
Having shown that the competition among ‘leading candidates’ leads to EU-wide 
campaigns (but does not automatically raise public awareness and interest in the elections), 
the focus now shifts to the possible effects on the profile of party groups in the EP.  
2.2. Strengthening the Profile of Party Groups in the European Parliament 
According to the second hypothesis, competition among ‘leading candidates’ 
strengthens the profile of party groups in the EP. To test this hypothesis, the role of the 
‘leading candidate’ in intensifying the organisation and interaction within the EP party group 
is analysed. Secondly, the role of the ‘leading candidate’ in contributing to internal party 
cohesion is assessed in view of its influence on ‘office seeking’. Finally, the role of the 
‘leading candidate’ in convincing his fellow EP party group members to engage in alliances 
with other parties based on ‘European ideologies’ is examined, as this could shape the party 
group’s ‘policy-seeking’.   
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(Re-) Election 
The agreement on a common ‘leading candidate’ and the cross-border support for 
Schulz reflects a ‘united party’ in a personalised European election campaign, which 
strengthens the interaction between the PES and the S&D as well as the exchange with the 
electorate. The EU-wide approach diminishes the perception of the European elections as a 
‘second-order national election’, in which “less is at stake” as they are primarily fought on 
national issues.
43
 Rather, the ‘leading candidate’ enables the electorate to link one European 
politician (and thus a face) to the S&D party group, who might be perceived as a ‘symbolic 
figure’ towards whom the others were oriented. Thus, the (re-)election of the party group’s 
members depends on the perception of the ‘leading candidate’ as well as on their own 
election campaign.   
The competition among ‘leading candidates’ enables a “personalisation of political 
claims”. 44  Such claims have to be communicated simply and effectively to citizens.  
However, mass communication poses a challenge to the European level as  
“the nationality remains a decisive variable in journalistic activities as they are in 
particular dependent on the political sphere in view of the policy issues”. 45 
The media are a powerful tool to bridge the cultural and linguistic divergences that emerge 
in an election campaign. According to Hackländer, correspondent and head of SWR studio 
in Brussels, the media are responsible for making citizens aware of the significant role of the 
EU, and it is important “to be informed about the decision makers and to take the 
opportunity to have a say in personnel decisions”.46 Use of media is one powerful tool to get 
the message across the Member States about the need to change the direction of the EU. 
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  H. Schmitt MZES, ‘The European Parliament Elections of June 2004: Still Second-Order?’, West 
European Politics, vol. 28, no. 3, 2007, p. 651.  
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  Ibid., p. 668. 
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  O. Baisnée, ‘Les médias et l’Union européenne : un espace public encore introuvable’, in C. Belot and B. 
Cautrès (eds.), La vie démocratique de l’Union européenne, Paris, La documentation française, 2006, p. 
69; Translated by the author. 
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  Interview with S. Hackländer, correspondent and head of SWR studio in Brussels, Brussels, 28 March 
2014.  
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Nonetheless, it is not sufficient to communicate the vision on how the policies of the EU 
should change. It is first and foremost necessary to convince the electorate of the vision: only 
a convincing result would provide the S&D party group with a political mandate that could 
enhance its power by providing its ‘leading candidate’ for the next Commission Presidency. 
 To find out to what extent the role of the ‘leading candidate’ might shape ‘office 
seeking’ within the EP party group, the focus shifts in the next section to the analysis of 
internal party cohesion.  
Office Seeking 
In light of the increasing powers of the EP, the cohesion of the mainstream party 
groups has improved. This underlines the correlation: “the more power an established 
political group has, the greater is the incentive and the necessity to cooperate”.47 It was 
expected that the ‘leading candidate’ Schulz might positively influence internal cohesion 
within the S&D party group, as he was regarded as a political figure towards whom the 
others were oriented. According to Schmidt, vice-president of the German Bundestag and 
Former Federal Minister, as well as Freitag, member of the German Bundestag and deputy 
foreign policy spokeswoman of the parliamentary group of Social Democrats, a ‘leading 
candidate’ strengthens the sense of solidarity within the S&D party group. However, this 
might not be immediately evident as it is a continuous process.
48
  
In general, voting cohesion inside mainstream party groups in the EP is relatively 
high. Nonetheless, it needs to be stressed that ‘group whipping’ within the EP is less strict 
than in national parliaments. Even though MEPs “shall be free and independent [and] shall 
vote on an individual and personal basis”49, they face a dilemma in the party system in the 
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EP due to the multi-level nature of the EU.
 50
 Nonetheless, the national cross-party support 
for the ‘leading candidate’ could contribute to a shift from a national identity to a European 
identity, which would be reflected in a stronger collaboration with fellow European party 
colleagues.  
As stated in the third Vote Watch Report, MEPs vote primarily along transnational 
political lines in the last EP, and the four largest political groups have recorded an increase 
in their cohesion rates.
51
 On average, the cohesion rate for the S&D party group is 91, 54 % 
in all policy areas from 2009 to 2014. 
52  
In line with the argument that an increase in party group size leads to more cohesion, 
the EPP party group was able to exercise more power as it is the strongest party in the 
current legislature.
53
 However, the influence of the ‘leading candidate’ on his fellow EP 
party members remains to be seen, as “loyalty to the party leadership is a statistically and 
substantively important determinant of who get what assignment”.54  
Nonetheless, Junker was not able to exercise influence on office assignments in 
particular in view of the committee assignments and the distribution of key positions in the 
EP as it was beyond his abilities as President of the Commission to take such decisions. On 
the other hand, as the re-elected President of the EP, Schulz was able to shape these 
decisions.  
To find out to what extent the role of the ‘leading candidate’ might shape ‘policy 
seeking’ within the EP party group, the focus shifts in the next section to the analysis of 
coalition formation within the EP. 
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Policy Seeking 
Given the fact that no single party has a majority in the EP, coalition formation is 
necessary to guarantee the absolute majority, as this is technically required in the second 
reading of the ‘Ordinary Legislative Procedure’.55 In addition to the technical reason, there is 
a pragmatic explanation: “the EP is most influential, regardless of the procedure, when it can 
present a unified front to the other EU institutions.”56 In the EP there are two different types 
of coalition formation, namely a ‘grand coalition’ and left/right voting. To analyse a possible 
movement from consensus-oriented towards partisan-oriented coalition formation in view of 
the role of the ‘leading candidate’, the two types of coalitions are analysed in detail. 
It is a common perception of party competition in the EP that the EPP and the S&D 
collude with than compete against each other.
57
 There are four main explanations for this 
voting behaviour: firstly, the aforementioned technical rules force the EPP and the S&D to 
vote together to guarantee the necessary majority in the EU’s legislative procedures. 
Secondly, there is a collective institutional interest of both EP party groups to increase the 
influence of the only directly elected institution as a whole.
58
 Thirdly, the EPP and the S&D 
share ideological similarities on many issues on the EU agenda. According to Martinez, legal 
advice to the President of the EP, the ‘grand coalition’ reflects a traditional and pro-
European approach against rising Euroscepticism in the EU.
59
 The final argument refers to 
the collusion between the EPP and the S&D “to prevent the smaller groups from securing 
influence in the internal workings of the EP”.60  
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The voting coalitions in the EP in the last legislature reflected the consolidated nature 
of the EP. 
61
 Even though there are no signs for a radical change, there are greater incentives 
for left/right politics in certain policy areas. A shift towards left/right politics is particularly 
visible in these three policy areas: budget, civil liberties and home affairs as well as 
environmental and public health. 
62
  Nonetheless, it is striking that the policy area ‘Economic 
and Monetary Affairs’ shows a “noticeable increase in the appearance of the ‘grand 
coalition’ on these issues”.63 The same applies for ‘Constitutional and Inter-Institutional 
Affairs’. Even though the competition among ‘leading candidates’ might contribute to a 
certain extent to the expected deliberation and party contestation within the Union, Schulz’s 
efforts to convince his fellow S&D party members to engage in alliances with left-wing 
parties would have remained limited in his function as President of the Commission. 
 To better understand the influence of the ‘leading candidate’ on the role of the EP in 
the institutional setting of the EU, the focus shifts in the following section to the possible 
effects on the accountability of the Commission vis-à-vis the only directly elected institution 
as well, as a possible strengthening of both institutions vis-à-vis the European Council. 
2.3.  Shaping Inter-Institutional Relations 
In light of the third hypothesis it is tested that the competition among ‘leading 
candidates’: improves the accountability of the Commission vis-à-vis the EP and thus the 
electorate; and strengthens the democratic and political standing of the EP and the 
Commission vis-à-vis the European Council. 
To test this hypothesis the symbolic relevance of the elected ‘leading candidate’ in 
view of the inter-institutional relationship between the EP and the Commission is analysed. 
Secondly, society’s expectations towards the European Council in view of the European 
elections are assessed.  
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The ‘Leading Candidate’: Only A Symbolic Act? 
According to Martinez, the role of the ‘leading candidate’ might not remarkably 
improve the already well-established inter-institutional relationship between the EP and the 
Commission.
64
 The role of the ‘leading candidate’ has to be examined in an inter-
institutional context, which will not change in the near future. Nonetheless, Martinez 
stressed that the elected President of the Commission has democratic support, which might 
be perceived as a symbolic act and could positively shape the inter-institutional 
relationship.
65
 In the literature, the Commission is either portrayed as a “technocratic, non-
majoritarian institution or as an agent of EU member governments”.66 Nonetheless, in view 
of the increasingly powerful role of the EP, several scholars refer to an increased 
parliamentarisation of the Commission: “To resolve specific institutional grievances and [...] 
to realign inter-institutional relations” the institutions have developed so-called ‘codes of 
conduct’.67  
However, it needs to be stressed that the EP and the Commission are not only inter-
institutionally linked, they are mutually dependent on each other. The close relationship 
between these institutions is facilitated by similar structures that are based on the same 
organisational principles: first of all the officials and politicians of both institutions regard 
their respective EU institution as their primary affiliation. Furthermore, the EP as well as the 
Commission regard “sectorisation as one of their basic principles of organisational 
specialisation”. 68  The supranational connections as well as the horizontally specialised 
structure lead to a behaviour which is characterised by a European dimension: MEPs 
increasingly vote and form transnational alliances (as shown in the previous section), and the 
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Commission proposals reflect “the ideological profile of either the Commissioner [...] or of 
the Commission President”. 69  These three structural similarities strengthen the inter-
institutional relationship, which is reflected in daily interaction between the EP and the 
Commission.  
In light of the possible influence of the ‘leading candidate’ on the process of 
politically shaping in the Commission, it is important to take the factors into account that 
influence the decision-making process in the College of Commissioners. In Article 17.3 TEU 
it is stated that: 
“The members of the Commission shall be chosen on the ground of their general 
competence and European commitment from persons whose independence is beyond 
doubt. In carrying out its responsibilities, the Commission shall be completely 
independent.”70 
Nonetheless, according to Morten Egeberg and Arndt Wonka, Commissioners’ behaviour is 
framed by four different roles, namely the ‘portfolio role’, the ‘Commission role’, the 
‘country role’ and the ‘party role’. Therefore Commissioners are influenced in their 
decision-making by various factors, which take on completely different emphasis depending 
on the respective context.
71
 Nonetheless,  
“while the ‘portfolio role’ seems to be most frequently evoked, both the ‘Commission 
role’ and the ‘country role’ are important ingredients of the College’s political life’. 
Less visible is the political ‘party role’”.72  
In light of these findings the influence of the elected ‘leading candidate’ as President of the 
Commission remains limited.
73
 On the other hand, due to his strong personal and political 
profile Schulz might have been able to influence the political shaping to a certain extent.
74
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To find out to what extent society’s expectations might ‘push’ the European Council 
to propose one of the ‘leading candidates’ as Commission candidate to the EP, the focus 
shifts in the next section to the relationship with this institution. 
Proposing the ‘Leading Candidate’ as Commission President: A Sign of Respect Towards 
the Electorate? 
In her speech at the opening ceremony of the 61
st
 academic year of the College of 
Europe in Bruges in November 2010, Merkel emphasized the role of the European Council: 
“It should not be overlooked that the European Council, too, is part of the EU; it is a 
EU institution. The Member States are constitutive elements of the Union, they are 
not its adversaries.”75 
It is without doubt that the European Council is an important institution in the EU. 
Nonetheless, according to Martinez the European Council will have to take the elections to 
the EP into account to create and strengthen confidence and trust among the European 
population; it serves as a gesture of respect towards the European electorate and reflects the 
spirit of the Treaty of Lisbon. However, it does not necessarily mean that the ‘leading 
candidate’ from the biggest EP party group would become President of the Commission.76 
The question of if and to what extent the newly introduced element of competing (and as a 
result elected) ‘leading candidate’ might influence the relationship between the EP and the 
European Council remains to be seen.  
To underline the experimental character of this work and to stress the complexity 
linked with the influence of ‘leading candidates’ for the Commission Presidency on the role 
of party groups in the EP, the focus shifts in the following part to the evaluation of the 
findings. 
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3.  A first Step towards a Federal Structure  
In view of the title question, “Politicising the European Union?” it can only be said that the 
competition among ‘leading candidates’ can be perceived as an attempt to do so. However, 
its success will be visible after the European elections and – most probably – only in a long 
term perspective. Despite its experimental character, this work shows remarkable findings.  
Firstly, the nomination and election process of Schulz as the ‘leading candidate’ as 
well as the common cross-border campaign characterised an EU-wide approach. However, 
as indicated in the polls, it did not automatically raise public awareness and interest in the 
election campaign. Secondly, the analysis showed that Schulz positively shaped the public 
perception of the S&D party group, which might have increased the chances for his fellow 
party members to be (re-)elected. At this point in time, it is not possible to measure his 
influence on internal party cohesion and coalition formation as ‘leading candidate’ but rather 
in his new role as re-elected EP President. Likewise the analysis did not show that Schulz 
would have been able to exercise influence on coalition formation. Thirdly, the competition 
among and final election of a ‘leading candidate’ is perceived as a ‘symbolic act’, which 
could deepen the already well-established relationship between the EP and the Commission 
and could strengthen the democratic and political standing of both institutions vis-à-vis the 
European Council. 
It can be concluded that competing ‘leading candidates’ enhances the process of 
deliberation and party contestation and thus strengthen the role of the EP party groups. 
Despite this development, it needs to be stressed that the institutional design of the Union is 
based on the principle of institutional balance and that “the EU still lacks several of the 
fundamental and interconnected characteristics normally associated with a parliamentary 
system”.77 Nonetheless, the new challenges and opportunities linked with Art. 17.7 TEU and 
its Declaration No. 11 might be perceived as a first step towards a federal structure. From a 
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long term perspective, this might even counteract the perceived democratic deficit in the 
EU.
78
 The official election result has shown that the step towards deliberation and party 
contestation has not stimulated the European population to go to vote. Due to the low turnout 
in the European elections, the following question needs to be asked: “Which direction will 
the EU take?”   
 
Conclusion 
As shown in this work, the competition among ‘leading candidates’ enhance the process of 
deliberation and party contestation and thus strengthen the role of EP party groups. In view 
of the experimental character of this work, the author was only able to fully prove that the 
competition among ‘leading candidates’ leads to EU-wide campaigns. However, the 
hypotheses that the competition strengthens the profile of EP party groups and improves the 
inter-institutional relationship remain to a great extent subject to assumptions and predictions 
at this point in time and might only be proven in a long term perspective. Nonetheless, the 
analysis of the influence of the ’leading candidate’ for the Commission Presidency on the 
role of EP party groups shows remarkable findings as summarized in the evaluation.  
The research design of this work proves helpful in light of the analysis of the 
influence of ‘leading candidates’ for the Commission Presidency on the role of EP party 
groups. Nonetheless, the theoretical part shows certain shortcomings: various criteria have 
not been taken into account, such as the analysis of the institutional strengths or the 
subsequent power linked to public visibility.
79
 In addition the analysis examines only the 
‘leading candidate’ Schulz and the S&D party group and therefore provides a limited 
perspective. A comparative analysis between the EPP and the S&D would provide further 
insights into this field.  
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Therefore it can be concluded that the shift towards left/right politics in the EU in 
general and the EP in particular might not be visible in the current legislature. Even though a 
visible shift towards left/right politics might not take place in the near future, it is 
nonetheless possible to speak of ‘leading candidates’ as a significant symbolic change. At a 
later point in time, these European elections might be regarded as the first step towards a 
currently unknown political path at the European level. Therefore, analysing the influence of 
‘leading candidates’ for the Commission Presidency on the role of EP party groups would be 
a promising avenue of future research.  
Even though the European elections did not bring a significant political change, they 
are of symbolic importance, which could pave the way for an effective change in the 
European elections in 2019 and thus justify the slogan of the recent EP election campaign 
‘This time it is different’.     
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